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Drone Strikes and the War Powers Resolution
Brock Laney1

T

ariq Khan lived in North Waziristan, which, along with its
southern counterpart, suffers the majority of US drone strikes
in Pakistan.2 A British investigator asked Tariq if he had ever
seen a drone, expecting to hear a report of sighting one or two drones
per week.3 Instead, Tariq reported that he “saw 10 or 15 every day,”
with drones keeping him awake at night and causing him to worry
constantly about his family’s safety.4 Tariq died shortly after this interview alongside his 12-year-old cousin. Both were killed by a US
drone.5
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Proponents have called drones a last-resort weapon against
terrorists,6 while critics respond by pointing out a number of harmful
consequences that potentially outweigh the strikes’ benefits.7 Drones
undoubtedly have negative side effects on populations surrounding
their targets; civilian deaths, psychological trauma, economic disruption, social deterioration, and disrupted religious practices characterize regions with high concentrations of drone strikes.8 These
consequences do not necessarily mean that drones should no longer
have a place in the US arsenal. Instead, these consequences suggest
that careful, decentralized decision making should characterize discussions regarding their use.
Currently, decision making regarding the deployment of drones
is concentrated in the hands of an alarmingly small number of individuals9 and is thereby somewhat removed from democratic processes. The evolution of drones into unique and powerful instruments
of defense has occurred without the accompanying legislative in6
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frastructure to adequately regulate their usage. With minor modifications to existing legislation, Congress can create an environment
wherein drones receive scrutiny from a wider audience. Specifically,
the War Powers Resolution (WPR), which outlines congressional
and presidential war powers and responsibilities, can be amended to
provide an institutionalized check on the President’s power to deploy
drones.
My argument proceeds by (1) briefly addressing background information on drone strikes, (2) discussing the WPR in response to
critiques of its constitutionality, (3) defending the inclusion of drones
in the resolution by comparing drones with conventional weapons
and conflict law, and (4) outlining a specific plan for adjusting the
resolution to account for drone strikes which includes expanding
the definition therein to explicitly include drones. Despite criticisms
claiming the contrary, the WPR protects rights and rules outlined
by the Constitution. Additionally, presidential compliance with the
resolution since its enactment implies an inherent legitimacy. Congressional efforts to revise the WPR to account for drones will provide a valuable check on presidential power.

I. Background
Drones, unmanned aircraft often sent on pinpoint bombing
and reconnaissance missions, have been used with increasing frequency over the past few years.10 Drone strikes are especially used
in areas that are difficult to reach and where political restrictions
make conventional warfare unfeasible. On Pakistan’s side of the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border, for example, terrorists and militants
have operated with relative ease from mountain caves and hideouts,

10
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Sept. 16, 2011, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-16/
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18

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 27, 2013

eluding US forces stationed in Afghanistan.11 With drones, the US
can achieve the dual objective of reaching remote and difficult areas
while avoiding American casualties.
Defenders of drone strikes argue that drones number among the
United States’ last few viable options for combating terrorists and
militants.12 Even proponents of drone strikes, however, recognize the
array of flaws associated with their use.13 To begin, finding and monitoring suspected terrorists requires highly accurate intelligence14
and isolating potential targets to avoid civilian casualties has proven
nearly impossible.15 One scholar pointed out that “the Taliban don’t
go to a military base to build bombs or do training, [so] there are
families and neighbors around,”16 which results in inadvertent civilian deaths from drone strikes.17 Next, the strikes are “poor second[s]
to arrest”18 because US intelligence personnel cannot collect information from victims.19
Illustrating another drawback, drone strikes in Pakistan have
exacerbated already tense US-Pakistan relations. Although this has
not resulted in formal military repercussions, Pakistani officials
have condemned drone activity in Pakistan because it violates their
11

See Lyse Doucet, Mullen Focuses on Afghanistan-Pakistan Border Havens, BBC News (July 31, 2011, 7:55 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-south-asia-14361024.
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sovereignty and harms their citizens.20 Similarly, the strikes can decrease US soft power abroad by disrupting diplomatic relations in
the Middle East and provoking victims to join terrorist groups in
the place of lost family members or friends.21 In response to a 2012
drone strike, for example, a member of the Yemeni Defense Ministry
said that he “would not be surprised if a hundred tribesmen joined
the lines of al-Qaeda as a result of the latest drone mistake.”22
These problems and the disputed efficacy of drone strikes23
make drones very costly and controversial weapons. The high costs
and dubious benefits create a set of decisions that democratic instincts suggest should not fall to only a few government officials. In
response to these concerns, some have called for a greater degree of
transparency along with the introduction of accountability to Congress for drone activity.24 This transparency and accountability acts
as an important step towards making the usage of drone strikes subject to public scrutiny.

20
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The growing frequency of US drone strikes and the high probability of drone usage proliferating25 to other countries indicate a
general movement towards unmanned military assets as war-making
tools. US legislators can anticipate future problems associated with
this shift by modifying existing legislation to account for drone
strikes now, thereby ensuring that future drone strikes occur under
transparent and democratic conditions. Through simple changes to
the WPR, Congress can take an important step towards controlling
the use of a complicated new resource.

II. The War Powers Resolution
Congress passed the WPR in an attempt to provide explicit legislative rules based on perceptions of the Framers’ intent when they
separated the powers to declare and direct war.26 The law was passed
after the Vietnam War to curtail the President’s somewhat unilateral war-making capabilities and make the executive branch more
accountable to Congress when unilateral action is necessary. The
resolution states that war can be initiated only if one of three conditions is fulfilled: “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”27
If the president deploys armed forces without a declaration of war,
the resolution requires the President to brief Congress on the conflict and justify the use of force within 48 hours.28 If Congress does
not ratify the war with an official declaration within 60 days, the
President then has 30 days to withdraw US armed forces from the
conflict.29 Although a straightforward law on its surface, critics have
taken issue with some of its details and implications.
25

See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-536, Nonproliferation
(2012).

26

War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1973).
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Critics, including many US Presidents,30 have questioned the
constitutionality of the WPR since it became law in 1973. Despite
this, all Presidents have either acted in accordance with the requirements of the WPR or have defended their lack of compliance by arguing that conflicts in which they have engaged do not apply to the
resolution’s requirements.31 To provide a recent example, President
Obama provided a report to Congress “consistent with the War Powers Resolution”32 after sending troops to Uganda to fight the Lord’s
Resistance Army.33 When Mr. Obama did not send a report to Congress on US military activities in Libya, Harold Koh, the legal advisor to the State Department, justified this silence by asserting that
US operations in Libya did not constitute war.34 Further, Koh explicitly stated that the administration did not believe the resolution to be
unconstitutional.35 These facts notwithstanding, I address constitutional discrepancies for the sake of strengthening the argument in
favor of the WPR.
(i) The Precedent-Violation Argument
The first objection to the constitutionality of the resolution came
in the form of a veto from President Nixon, who stated that,
One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain
authorities after sixty days unless the Congress extended
30

Richard Grimmett, Cong. Research Serv., RL32267, The War Powers
Resolution: After Thirty Years (2004).
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Letter from Barack Obama, U.S. President, to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives & the President Pro Tempore of the Senate
(Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2011/10/14/letter-president-speaker-house-representatives-andpresident-pro-tempore.
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in Libya Operation, N.Y. Times, June 15, 2011, http://www.nytimes.
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them. Another would allow the Congress to eliminate certain authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution—an action which does not normally have the force
of law, since it denies the President his constitutional role in
approving legislation.36
No constitutional provision explicitly supports Nixon’s first objection. Rather, he relies on historical precedent, asserting that the
resolution would limit powers that the executive branch had been
exercising properly for years.37 In a vein similar to Nixon’s, some
have argued that the resolution tampers with an already effective
separation of powers, with one scholar arguing that neither branch
has the authority to define the limits of another’s power.38
Historical precedent notwithstanding, Congress justified the
resolution’s provisions by tying them to specific powers outlined in
the Constitution. The legislation cites the Constitution, which “specifically provide[s] that the Congress shall have the power to make
all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only
its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”39 In the same section, Congress is given the power “to
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces” as well as the responsibility to “provide for calling forth the
Militia.”40 The WPR violates neither constitutional statement, but is
instead supported by both. The resolution is an example of Congress
filling the legislative role outlined in the first statement and creates
rules that clearly fall under the category outlined in the second.

36

Richard Nixon, Veto of the War Powers Resolution (Oct. 24, 1973), in
Public Papers of the Presidents 311 (Gerhard Peters & John T. Woolley
eds., 2013).

37
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38
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The President may exercise the right to deploy troops when national emergencies require it.41 Without accountability to Congress,
however, the President could hypothetically wage war unilaterally
and indefinitely. It is not difficult to imagine, for example, the President engaging in a long-term armed conflict without congressional
approval, defending the conflict with an appeal to national defense.
As an example, Truman introduced American troops into the Korean War without congressional approval, relying instead on inferences drawn from a UN Security Council Resolution.42 Although
major fighting in Korea lasted only three years, American soldiers
remain in South Korea today in the unsteady aftermath of a war that
has not technically ended.43 Thus, a lack of carefully enforced institutionalized oversights can potentially lend itself to lengthy campaigns waged without congressional sanction.
Critics might contend that long, undeclared campaigns are necessary for national defense. While this is likely true in many cases,
the Constitution only allows for non-congressionally sanctioned military action when the US is “actually invaded, or in such imminent
Danger as will not admit of delay.”44 Allowing Congress to check the
President’s long-term war powers protects the constitutional provision that the Legislature has the responsibility and right to declare
war and leaves the essential short-term war powers untouched.
(ii) The Legislative Veto
Nixon’s second constitutional objection concerns the presence in
the resolution of a legislative veto.45 The WPR contains a provision
41

War Powers Resolution § 1541(c).

42

Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89
Am. J. Int’l Law 21, 21 (1995).

43

Charles Armstrong, The Korean War Never Ended, CNN Opinion, (May
26, 2010, 10:19 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/05/24/armstrong.north.korea/index.html (an armistice was signed, but never a peace
treaty).

44

U.S. Const. art. I, § X.

45
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allowing Congress to require the President, by joint resolution, to
remove American forces from combat if the designated time limit
expires.46 According to Nixon, this provision constitutes a legislative
veto, which, because it circumvents presentment to the Executive,
acts as a de facto override of the President’s power to veto an act of
Congress.47 Questions concerning the legislative veto arose in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the results of which
have fueled criticisms of the WPR similar in nature to Nixon’s.
Jagdish Chadha, a Kenyan slated for deportation from the US,
submitted a deportation appeal to the Immigration and Naturalization
Services (INS) and an immigration judge found that Chadha qualified for a suspension of his deportation.48 Chadha’s request granted,
the INS submitted his name, along with 339 others, to Congress for
approval.49 The House of Representatives, exercising their perceived
legal right to apply a legislative veto, overruled the judge’s decision,
prompting an appeals process that escalated to the Supreme Court.50
The Court ultimately ruled against the House, finding the legislative veto unconstitutional,51 pointing out additionally that the House
violated the principle of bicameralism.52 This decision has provided
support for critics of the WPR who condemn the legislative veto
provision found therein.53
The Court’s ruling in Chadha does not, however, necessarily
outlaw legislative vetoes generally, nor does it guarantee the unconstitutionality of their usage under the WPR for two reasons. First,
dissenting opinions indicate the importance of the legislative veto
in preserving Congress’s constitutional powers. Supreme Court Jus46

War Powers Resolution § 1541(c).

47

See Nixon, supra note 36.

48

Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923, 924
(1983) (Rehnquist, J. & White, J., dissenting).

49

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 924.

50

See id.

51

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.

52

See id. at 949.

53
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tice Powell, who agreed with the ruling “only in the judgment,”54
argued that “the breadth of this holding gives one pause. Congress
has included the veto in literally hundreds of statutes, dating back
to the 1930’s. Congress clearly views this procedure as essential to
controlling the delegation of power to administrative agencies.”55
Similarly, Justice White argued in a dissenting opinion that without the legislative veto, Congress would be forced to “refrain from
delegating necessary authority . . . or, in the alternative, to abdicate
its law-making function to the Executive Branch and independent
agencies.”56 These opinions indicate that including legislative vetoes
in some statutes and resolutions strengthens the system of checks
and balances instead of violating them.
Second, the legislative action condemned in Chadha is not perfectly comparable to the one in the WPR. The court found additional
fault with the House’s unilateral action because it violated the principle of bicameralism.57 The additional violation of bicameralism
makes the ruling in Chadha distinct from other forms of legislative
vetoes, thus potentially exempting the WPR from the implications of
this case. These distinctions have led some scholars to conclude that
Chadha does not condemn the WPR.58
Despite key differences between the legislative veto in Chadha
and the one in the WPR, some argue that Chadha does ultimately
confirm the unconstitutionality of the legislative veto in the resolution.59 Accepting this consensus, however, still does not destroy the

54

Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959 (Powell, J., concurring).

55

Id. at 959, 960.

56

Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting).

57

Id. at 949 (majority opinion).

58

See, e.g., G. Sidney Buchanan, In Defense of the War Powers Resolution:
Chadha Does Not Apply, 22 Hous. L. Rev. 1155 (1985); Mark L. Krotoski, Essential Elements of Reform of the War Powers Resolution, 29 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 607 (1989); Clement J. Zablocki, War Powers Resolution:
Its Past Record and Future Promise, 17 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 579 (1984).

59

See, e.g., Krotoski, supra note 53.
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validity of the WPR. The resolution’s Separability Clause60 indicates
that all other sections remain legally intact should any other section
fail to survive constitutional scrutiny.61 Although the removal of the
legislative veto capability would limit the ability of the legislature to
enforce the resolution, there are other tools Congress could implement to check presidential action.62
In conclusion, criticisms of the WPR ultimately fail because (1)
the resolution protects powers explicitly granted by the Constitution,63
(2) the legislative veto helps Congress protect constitutionally granted war powers,64 and (3) even given a conclusively unconstitutional
legislative veto, the Separability Clause protects all other clauses
in the resolution.65 Finally, regardless of criticisms of the WPR, US
Presidents have provided reports to Congress consistent with the requirements of the legislation since its enactment, providing evidence
of its legitimacy.66

III. Drone Strikes and the War Powers Resolution
Observed individually, single drone strikes might more closely
resemble assassinations than warfare. A more comprehensive view
of US drone operations in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia, however,
reveals several characteristics that place drone strikes campaigns
more securely within the category of conventional warfare. Just as
Yorktown and Bunker Hill fall under the broader category of the
American Revolutionary War, individual drone strikes are often
constituent parts of larger campaigns with identifiable goals. Pro60

War Powers Resolution § 1548.

61

See Zablocki, supra note 58, at 590.

62

See, e.g., Krotoski, supra note 58, 690 (alternatives to a joint resolution
include, for example, overruling a presidential veto with a two-thirds
majority or cutting off funds to the military).

63

See War Powers Resolution § 1541.

64

Id.

65

See id. § 1548.
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longed drone strike campaigns resemble war in levels of casualties,
spillover effects into civilian populations, and consistency of attacks.
Additionally, the Obama administration has justified drone activity
by appealing to international conflict law, calling drone attacks part
of a war on a specific belligerent.67 Thus, in this section I discuss
similarities between drone strikes campaigns and war to justify the
inclusion of drones under the authority of Congress. After establishing this, I discuss specific changes to the WPR that can provide an
institutionalized accounting for drone activity.
(i) War-Like Characteristics of Drone Strikes Campaigns
First, drone strikes cause civilian and militant casualties in numbers that resemble trends typical of conventional warfare. Drone
strikes’ clandestine nature makes estimates of deaths from attacks
difficult to calculate, but careful studies of drone activity in Pakistan,
Yemen, and Somalia since 2002 estimate casualties between 3,90068
and 4,700.69 To provide a comparison, the US suffered roughly 4,485
casualties from 2003-2012 in Iraq.70Although US officials have
praised drones as capable of conducting surgical strikes with little
or no collateral damage,71 third parties estimate hundreds of civilian
67

Ari Shapiro, U.S. Drone Strikes are Justified, Legal Adviser Says, NPR
(March 26, 2010, 2:45 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.
php?storyId=125206000.

68

The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, Casualty Estimates, http://www.
thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drone-data/ (last visited Feb.
27, 2013).

69

US Senator Says Drones Death Toll is 4700, The Telegraph, Feb. 21,
2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/
usa/9884667/US-senator-says-drones-death-toll-is-4700.html.

70

Casualties in Iraq, The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/IRAQ-CASUALTY-COUNT.html (last visited
Feb. 27, 2013); Operation Iraqi Freedom, icasualties.org, http://icasualties.org/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).

71

Ken Dilanian, U.S. Counter-Terrorism Strategy to Rely on Surgical
Strikes, Unmanned Drones, L.A. Times, June 29, 2011, http://articles.
latimes.com/2011/jun/29/news/la-pn-al-qaeda-strategy-20110629.
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casualties.72 Drone strikes also cause significant injuries and property damage.73 Finally, the nearly constant presence of drones over
many villages in North and South Waziristan causes psychological
and stress-related health problems that affect large proportions of
civilian populations.74
Next, drone activity resembles war in its targeting of a specific
belligerent over an extended period of time. Drone strikes occur on
a monthly basis, with an average of roughly 32 deaths per month.75
Further, most drone strikes have targeted militants, the majority of
which were associated with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.76 Attorney
General Holder argued that the US faces a “stateless enemy,”77 but it
is a specific enemy nonetheless. These facts, along with the regional
focus of anti-militant drone strikes, bear similarity to conventional
warfare wherein belligerents remain fixed and identifiable throughout the duration of a conflict.
Finally, the Obama administration consistently justifies drone
activity by citing international law as it relates to war, referring to
individual drone strikes as part of a war on al-Qaeda and the Taliban.78 Harold Koh, for example, defended drones by referencing the
72

See, e.g., International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic
at Stanford Law School & Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of
Law, supra note 8; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, supra note
68.

73

See International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at
Stanford Law School & Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law,
supra note 8.

74

See International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at
Stanford Law School & Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law,
supra note 8, at 80-88.

75

See The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, supra note 68.

76

See The Year of the Drone: Key Observations, The New America Foundation, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones/observations (last
visited Feb. 27, 2013).

77

Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Address at Northwestern University School of
Law (Mar. 5, 2012).

78

Shapiro, supra note 67.

Drone Strikes and the War Powers Resolution

29

right of the US to self-defense, which is sanctioned by international
law.79 Koh stated that “the U.S. is in armed conflict with al-Qaeda as
well as the Taliban and associated forces in response to the horrific
acts of 9/11.”80 The administration’s explicit and repeated branding
of drone activity in the Middle East as war provides strong evidence
that drone campaigns deserve attention under the WPR alongside
conventional warfare.
Admittedly, drone campaigns are not identical to other forms of
war. Pakistan, for example, has not reacted to US military activity in
its country with physical retributive action. In drone warfare, however, countries are not the targets, which explains in great measure
Pakistan’s lack of military retaliation. Classifying drone campaigns
as war does not require complete uniformity of attributes with other
implements of traditional warfare because the nature of war is context dependent. Drones, deployed in the name of national defense,
should not be subject to a separate list of constraints than are other
instruments of war deployed for similar reasons.81
(ii) Accounting for Drones in the War Powers Resolution
The inclusion of drone strikes in the WPR would duly anticipate
an increasing trend towards fighting through unmanned vehicles.82
This global trend has indicated that “technologies that remove humans from the battlefield are becoming the new normal in war.”83
The costs to the US in terms of personnel casualties and political
79

Shapiro, supra note 67.

80

Shapiro, supra note 67.

81

Huma Imtiaz, Drones Have Taken Us Into Undeclared War in Pakistan:
US Congressman, The Express Tribune (May 31, 2012), http://tribune.
com.pk/story/386903/congressmen-ask-obama-for-target-criteria-legaljustification-of-drone-strikes/.

82

See, e.g., Drone Wars UK, Mapping Drone Proliferation: UAVs in 76
Countries, Global Research (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.globalresearch.
ca/mapping-drone-proliferation-uavs-in-76-countries/5305191.
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Peter W. Singer, Op-Ed., Do Drones Undermine Democracy?, N.Y. Times,
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capital remain so low relative to other types of conflict that drone
usage will likely persist or increase in frequency. The changing
nature of international conflict suggests that drones and other unmanned military assets will probably become important aspects of
war. Properly classifying drones and implementing a congressional
check on their usage at a time when they are emerging as conventional weapons is therefore very important.
Accounting for drones through the WPR would require only
small modifications to the legislation. The resolution refers to “armed
forces” as the asset of interest that Congress seeks to regulate.84 To
induct drones into the WPR, legislators can expand the definition
of armed forces therein to explicitly include drones and other unmanned military assets. Specifically, the resolution should define
“armed forces” as any US military asset, manned or unmanned,
deployed in the interest of national security with specific military
target(s). Similar to the current version of the resolution, the updated
law should require any President that deploys these military assets to
abide by the restrictions and protocols outlined therein.
An effective definition of drone strikes as part of the armed
forces must necessarily address conditional factors since drones are
not used exclusively for long-term campaigns. Drones are sometimes
used for assassinations and other objectives, and although guidelines
for controlling their use in these other areas are too broad to be discussed here, modifications to the resolution should account for those
distinct circumstances. To avoid unnecessary and possibly detrimental consequences of reporting covert operations to Congress, the
updated resolution should include a clause that limits the type of
drone activity the President must report to Congress. To distinguish
between long-term campaigns and single attacks, the law should
specify that two attacks targeting the same group or occurring in the
same country within one month of each other constitute the beginning of a campaign. Once this condition is met, proceeding with the
campaign would require presidential action as outlined in the WPR.
Although seemingly arbitrary, two drone strikes in one month
is likely an effective indicator that a series of attacks is becoming a
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campaign, and Congress should have the power to exert its constitutional authority when such a benchmark is reached. Reports indicate
that there have been, on average, 2.84 drone attacks per month in
Pakistan since 2004.85 Attacks in Yemen exhibit similar patterns,
although the consistency of those attacks has not risen to Pakistan’s
levels until recently.86 Using these current trends as a baseline helps
determine the appropriate attack frequency for determining the
starting point of a campaign. Because unsuccessful assassination attempts may necessitate a second attack in a relatively short period of
time, the success of an attack should be considered in the definition
of which attacks count towards defining a series of attacks as a campaign. Only attacks that successfully eliminate the intended target
should be counted towards the limit. This will allow for repeated
attempts if an assassination or other single operation endeavor fails
after an initial attempt.
Some might argue that including drone strikes in the WPR
raises the cost of using drones to an unacceptably high level because
their use would require formal sanction. Congressional approval,
however, does not necessarily constitute an official declaration of
war. Presidents have reported a number of conflicts to Congress
consistent with the WPR that have proceeded without an official
declaration from Congress.87 Additionally, the Obama administration explicitly classifies the conflict with al-Qaeda and the Taliban
as “armed conflict”88 and gaining explicit approval from Congress
would not change the costs of moving forward with the conflict.
Finally, obtaining congressional approval would potentially create
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greater domestic legitimacy for a campaign, thereby strengthening
the President’s political position instead of weakening it. These considerations indicate that Congress can justifiably and easily address
the lack of institutional oversight for drone warfare through modifying the WPR.

IV. Conclusion
Although critics have disputed the constitutionality of the WPR,
the major functional pieces of the law are specifically backed by the
Constitution. Further, US Presidents have provided reports to Congress in compliance with the legislation, suggesting some level of
implied legitimacy for the resolution. Revising the WPR to include
drones and other non-conventional weapons will provide an essential check on presidential power as these forms of conflict become
more common in the future.
The current drone strikes campaign has proven very costly
and the cost-benefit analysis should not be limited to the President,
White House aides, and a handful of correspondents at the CIA. The
negative consequences of drone strikes suggest that a greater number of decision makers should become involved in the discussion
of whether or not to move forward with these costly campaigns of
dubious merit.
The nature of conflict is constantly evolving. Legislation must
also evolve through a combination of pragmatism and foresight in
the interest of protecting democratic processes and human rights.

